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Abstract
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm that provides unprecedented
flexibility in dynamically reconfiguring an IP network. It enables various applications such as network
management, quality of service (QoS) optimization, and system resilience enhancement. Pilot studies have
investigated the possibilities of applying SDN on smart grid communications, while the specific benefits and
risks that SDN may bring to the resilience of smart grids against accidental failures and malicious attacks
remain largely unexplored. Without a systematic understanding of these issues and convincing validations
of proposed solutions, the power industry will be unlikely to embrace SDN, since resilience is always a key
consideration for critical infrastructures like power grids. In this position paper, we aim to provide an
initial understanding of these issues, by investigating (1) how SDN can enhance the resilience of typical
smart grids to malicious attacks, (2) additional risks introduced by SDN and how to manage them, and
(3) how to validate and evaluate SDN-based resilience solutions. Our goal is also to trigger more profound
discussions on applying SDN to smart grids and inspire innovative SDN-based solutions for enhancing smart
grid resilience.
1 Introduction
As a fundamental part of the smart grid infrastructure, a communication network connects massive grid devices
over vast geographic areas to support the grid’s supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.
Current grid communication networks are based on the standard IP networking paradigm, where the network
functionality (e.g., routing) is mostly fixed at the design phase. At run time, it is often tedious, cumbersome,
and even impossible to reconfigure a network to react in time to accidental and malicious events that undermine
grid efficiency and safety. Moreover, such a non-adaptive paradigm can become a performance and resilience
bottleneck, because of the increasing adoption of modern smart grid technologies that request higher and
dynamic network bandwidth and, meanwhile, may expose a larger attack surface because of the pervasive
use of software. Examples include phasor measurement units (PMUs) and customer smart meters, which are
bandwidth-demanding and found to be vulnerable [7, 25].
This position paper considers the application of software-defined networking (SDN) to smart grids for
enhancing system resilience. SDN is a new networking paradigm whose key feature is the separation of the
control plane and the data plane [10]. In SDN, network switches are simple forwarding devices, whose forwarding
rules can be dynamically configured by a central controller. With the switches and the controller conforming
to a control plane protocol (e.g., the OpenFlow protocol [19]), SDN empowers network operators to redefine
the operations of a network at run time. In general network environments, SDN has been employed for real-
time optimization of network quality of service (QoS) [13] as well as rapid response to detected failures and
performance degradation caused by accidental failures [24] and malicious attacks [26].
Several studies [5, 9, 14, 20, 35] advocate adopting SDN to enrich functionality and improve QoS of smart
grid communication networks by leveraging SDN’s run-time configurability. While QoS is an important issue,
system resilience, i.e., the ability of a system to recover and maintain critical services despite accidental failures
and malicious attacks, is also a key consideration for critical infrastructures like power grids. In particular, the
∗This technical report also appeared as a position paper in The 1st Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS), April
14-17, 2015, Singapore.
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resilience to attacks has received significantly heightened attention given recent security incidents in national
critical infrastructures, such as Stuxnet [17] and Dragonfly [11]. Nonetheless, without a systematic understand-
ing of the resilience benefits and risks that SDN can bring to smart grids, as well as the approaches to manage
the risks, the power grid industry is unlikely to adopt SDN technologies. A key challenge in understanding these
issues is the need to respect power-engineering-specific requirements and the complex cyber-physical coupling
in the sensing-control-actuation closed loops in smart grids.
In this paper, we attempt to provide an initial understanding of the benefits and risks of SDN for smart
grid resilience. Specifically, through illustrative examples, we discuss the following three questions:
(1) What are the opportunities for SDN to enhance smart grid resilience? In this context, a key advantage of
SDN is its ability to dynamically configure the network (e.g., to create and delete routing paths) to prevent
failures and attacks, mitigate their impact if they occur, and isolate them if possible. Although in principle
this advantage applies to a broad class of accidental failures and malicious attacks, our focus in this paper
is on attacks. Specifically, we discuss three use cases. First, we propose to use SDN to establish dynamic
routes for grid control commands, only when the commands are to be transmitted from a control center to
grid devices. This approach significantly shrinks the time window in which the attacker can inject malicious
commands. Moreover, it also prohibits malicious rerouting and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Second, we
propose to use SDN to reset switches or re-establish the routing of a grid control application upon the detec-
tion of compromised switches, to maintain grid control quality. Third, we propose to use SDN to hot-swap
certain grid communication channels from grid-owned communication networks to the public Internet with
sufficient encryption, in the presence of devastating attacks in the grid-owned networks. In summary, SDN can
significantly raise the bar for attacks to be successful and provide fast network recovery for sustainable grid
operations in the presence of attacks.
(2) What are the security risks that SDN brings to smart grids? System complexity often engenders both
features and vulnerabilities. SDN brings two major risks. First, its control plane may contain vulnerabilities
in its software. Second, its central controller is subject to single-point failures and DoS attacks [15, 28]. As
SDN is an emerging technology, its security is still being investigated and improved in the general network
context [8, 27]. However, it is also imperative to examine its security in smart grid environments with due con-
sideration of the grid-specific requirements and the cyber-physical coupling. For instance, malicious rerouting
of a sensor/control data flow using a long-latency path may be valid from a pure networking perspective, but
may reduce the operational quality of grid control systems [4, 32, 33]. In this paper, we discuss three concrete
security issues and possible countermeasures. First, a compromised SDN controller may issue malicious SDN
control messages to undermine network performance and even destroy the network topology. We propose to
examine each outgoing SDN control message by predicting its potential cyber and physical impact on the grid.
Second, we propose to leverage several unique characteristics of grid communication traffic for early detection of
DoS attempts. Third, we discuss a potential attack in which the attacker can deploy inside the communication
network a “darknet” that hides its malicious activities (e.g., to send malicious commands to grid devices) from
monitoring channels. Recent research results on rootkit detection [36, 23] may shed light on detection of such
darknets in SDN. All the above security issues call for important future research to make SDN more viable for
smart grids.
(3) How do we validate and evaluate the above proposals? Validation and evaluation of resilience solutions
for complex cyber-physical systems like smart grids remain difficult problems. Integration of SDN will create
additional challenges. In that regard, we describe our ongoing research in establishing a smart grid testbed
that integrates Mininet (an SDN emulator), PowerWorld (a power system simulator), and a Bro-based seman-
tic intrusion detection system (IDS) that analyzes the DNP3 traffic of a power grid SCADA system. The
Mininet-PowerWorld co-simulator provides the cyber and physical “ground truth”, while the IDS provides at-
tack detection results for triggering SDN counteractions as well as a base framework to implement SDN control
message verification. In summary, the testbed provides a handy and extensible environment that facilitates the
exploration and validation of innovative ideas and solutions for smart grid resilience by SDN techniques.
Organization Section 2 briefly discusses related research, and Section 3 illustrates the architecture of
SDN-enabled smart grids. Section 4 discusses examples of how SDN techniques can potentially improve grid
resilience, while Section 5 explains some of the remaining challenges in applying SDN to improve smart grid
resilience. In Section 6, we propose a testbed for prototyping and validating our ideas in, and we conclude in
Section 7.
2
2 Related Work
As an SDN paradigm, OpenFlow was originally proposed as a pragmatic compromise that allows researchers
to experiment with new network protocols at scale, without the need for switch vendors to expose internals of
their products [19]. Subsequently, OpenFlow-based SDN has received significant research attention [6, 8, 15, 24]
and has been applied to the building of various enterprise production networks, such as Google’s data center
network [13].
Using SDN to enhance network security and securing SDN itself have received increasing research interest
for computer networks. Shin et al. [26] present FRESCO, a framework for composing security applications
in OpenFlow networks with NOX as the SDN controller. Using FRESCO’s scripting language, the imple-
mentations of sample security applications are less complex than the legacy implementations and those based
directly on OpenFlow primitives. A position paper [16] points out the vulnerabilities brought by SDN to a
system, such as the use of software and the possibility of single-point failure due to centralization of network
control. Shin et al. [27] design a robust and secure SDN controller, which separates the controller kernel and
SDN applications, manages application resources, and provides access control. Dhawan et al. [8] design an
SDN application to prevent various attacks (e.g., ARP poisoning and DoS attacks) launched by malicious end
hosts and compromised SDN switches. Avant-Guard [28] proposes a proxy-based solution to mitigate control
and data plane saturation attacks, and more recently, Ambrosin et al. propose mitigation of buffer saturation
attacks on such SDN switch proxies themselves [3].
SDN has also been proposed for network management and QoS in smart grids. Zhang et al. [35] discuss
three use cases of SDN in smart grids, i.e., content-based data exchange, virtual networks for distributed energy
resource (DER) aggregation, and smart building management. Goodney et al. [9] propose an efficient multicast
SDN system that connects high-rate PMUs and data subscribers with different data rate requirements. Molina
et al. [20] and Cahn et al. [5] propose to integrate SDN with IEC-61850-based substation automation systems.
SDN can facilitate and improve the networking of many (up to a hundred) intelligent electric devices (IEDs)
in a substation, by shortest path forwarding, multicast traffic reduction, load balancing, etc. Kim et al. [14]
propose to use OpenFlow switches to form virtual local-area networks (VLANs) for multiple grid applications
with different QoS requirements. For example, a PMU data collection tree desires smaller depth because of
stringent real-time requirements, while a consumer meter data collection tree prefers smaller width due to the
limited flow table memory in current off-the-shelf OpenFlow switches.
On the other hand, applying SDN to improve smart grid resilience has not received significant attention.
Molina et al. [20] discuss an OpenFlow’s fast failover mechanism upon the detection of node failures in the
application of SDN to IEC-61850-based substations. In [31], Sydney et al. present a prototype that integrates a
4-bus power grid testbed with an OpenFlow network. They demonstrate the impact of a coincident occurrence of
a communication link failure and a load shedding event caused by a generator failure. Despite these discussions
and studies, the benefits and risks of SDN for smart grid resilience, to malicious attacks in particular, remains
largely unexplored. Moreover, the associated validation and verification problems are also open and challenging,
because of the cyber and physical complexities of smart grids.
3 Overview of SDN-enabled Grids
With run-time configurability, SDN can bring significant benefits to the smart grid landscape. We envisage
a future in which, by adopting SDN, grid operators will gain greater power and flexibility in defeating or
mitigating cyber-attacks. This section describes a simplified architecture of an SDN-enabled smart grid and
highlights several threats that SDN can help mitigate.
Fig. 1 illustrates an SDN-enabled smart grid with three major components: a control center, a communi-
cation network, and a power grid (exemplified by the IEEE 14-bus test system).
The grid is mainly controlled by the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system involving
computers, networks, control devices, and software. The control center runs the SCADA master commodity
computers and servers to perform various grid control applications, e.g., grid status monitoring, under-frequency
load shedding, frequency and voltage controls, and so forth. The SCADA master collects measurement data
and transmits control commands from/to SCADA slaves in the grid via the grid communication network; the
SCADA slaves, in turn, interact with various control devices. Recently, control devices in smart grids are
increasingly being equipped with advanced computing capabilities, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) operating
systems and application software, and various communication interfaces. Such “smart” control devices, e.g.,
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Figure 1: A simplified architecture of an SDN-enabled grid.
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), collect readings from sensors, e.g.,
traditional meters and PMUs, and issue commands to actuators, e.g., circuit breakers and tap changers.
With SDN technologies, the communication network shared by the SCADA master, SCADA slaves, and
control devices, sensors, and actuators can be controlled by the SDN controller, with certain legacy network
segments using legacy switches. The SDN controller runs various SDN applications to reconfigure the commu-
nication network at the right times to optimize QoS and implement resilience support.
In addition, the control center may run an IDS to analyze all incoming and outgoing packets to detect
potential malicious activities. More specifically, the SCADA master, the SDN controller, and the IDS can
communicate with each other for coordinated actions. We note that the proposed architecture does not mandate
specific means of communication among the SCADA master, the SDN controller, and the IDS. The different
communication channels are explained as follows (cf. Fig. 1): ¶ The SCADA master and the SDN controller
can coordinate their actions to ensure correct and timely retrievals of sensor measurements and deliveries of
control commands. · The IDS can notify the SDN controller upon the detection of attacks, possibly with attack
profiles (e.g., which data flow paths have been compromised), such that the SDN controller can reconfigure
the network accordingly; meanwhile, the SDN controller can provide the IDS with the overall network status
to help with attack detection. ¸ The IDS can notify the SCADA master upon the detection of the attacks,
such that the SCADA master can tune control parameters to mitigate the impact of attacks; meanwhile, the
SCADA master can provide the IDS with detailed run-time information to help detect attacks.
Although our discussions in this paper are independent of how the interactions¶, ·, and¸ are substantiated
in the control center, as a general security practice, we assume that they are directly connected via a separate
LAN from the SDN-controlled network. Since our focus here is on SDN for grid resilience, our discussions in
this paper mainly involve ¶ and ·. For the interaction ¸, we refer readers to existing studies (e.g., [18]) for
more details.
A smart grid faces various cybersecurity threats due to device and system vulnerabilities, careless vendor
software upgrade, disgruntled employees, etc. To facilitate our discussion on the opportunities and challenges
of SDN in improving grid resilience, we specifically categorize related threats to an SDN-enabled smart grid
into the following classes (also illustrated in Figure 1). The categorization is mainly based on the components
targeted by the attacks:
(A1) Compromised network switches;
(A2) Compromised grid devices, e.g., RTUs, relays, or SCADA slaves;
(A3) Compromised SDN controllers and/or SDN controller applications.1
The threats A1 and A2 are faced by any smart grid, while A3 is specific to SDN-enabled smart grids. Note that
the threat A1 may become more credible in SDN-enabled smart grids, because of the software-based switch
control and reduced switch heterogeneity [16]. In Section 4, we discuss how to leverage SDN to defeat or
1In the rest of this paper, we use the labels A1 to A3 to refer to the three classes of threats.
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Figure 2: Illustration of SDN-enabled defense against attacks on control devices in a smart grid. (A: Disabled
path to prevent compromised RTUs from redirecting commands to unwanted relays. B: Filtering packets to
mitigate DDoS attacks.)
mitigate A1 and A2. In Section 5, we discuss the challenges brought by A1 and A3, as well as the approaches
to manage them to make SDN more viable for enhancing smart grid resilience.
4 Grid Resilience Enhancement
Opportunities with SDN
This section discusses three use cases to demonstrate how SDN can be leveraged to improve smart grid resilience
to attacks.
4.1 Efficient Detection of Attacks on Critical Control Devices
Smart control devices, e.g., IEDs and RTUs, are playing a major role in smart grid operations. At the same
time, such advanced computing and networking devices can expose a larger attack surface to attackers, who can
penetrate the control network via various means, e.g., an imperfect “air gap” from the Internet, USB devices,
and vendor software updates. Traditional security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) are inadequate, as seen in recent
security incidents [11, 17], because they often reside on network boundaries and cannot protect the system once
they are bypassed.
SDN techniques enable unprecedented capabilities for preventing such attacks by dynamically reconfiguring
the network to filter out unwanted and potentially malicious traffic due to the threats A1 and A2. For example,
as illustrated in Fig. 1, the SCADA master and the SDN controller can coordinate to automatically establish
a route to transmit control commands only when necessary. That will significantly shorten the time window
during which an attacker can inject malicious control commands from a compromised grid control application
or a compromised network switch. Moreover, as illustrated in Fig. 2A, even if an attacker compromises a critical
RTU that forwards control commands to relays, he/she will not be able to maliciously reroute the commands
to a different relay to cause damage to the grid.
As another example, an attacker can spoof packets that request sensors or relays to send measurements to
a certain RTU or a data aggregator. That could, in turn, trigger flooded traffic from many sensors or relays to
the victim RTU or data aggregator. As illustrated in Fig. 2B, with SDN, the control center can dynamically
configure the switch, so that dynamic monitoring can be implemented to filter out suspiciously excessive traffic
towards a certain destination. That can significantly alleviate the load of the victim RTU under such attacks,
and maintain the overall availability of the grid communication network. In summary, we envision that SDN
can provide handy support in constructing more flexible, precise, and efficient prevention and countermeasures
against threats to critical devices in smart grid SCADA systems.
5
4.2 Resilient Virtual Network Layer for Grid Control Applications
Compromised network switches (A1) may launch a class of attacks that cannot be easily detected and confirmed.
A representative example is malicious packet delay, which can lead to synchronization issues, performance
degradation of grid controls [4, 33], and even destabilization [32]. It is often hard to recognize the presence of
delay attacks, especially when the attacker strategically and perhaps mildly delays sensor measurement and/or
control command packets to undermine the operation optimality. That is in contrast to integrity attacks,
which can be detected by cryptographic mechanisms and out-of-band verification. Other examples of such
hard-to-confirm attacks include selective packet drop and replay. Nevertheless, detection and confirmation of
this class of attacks often involve cumbersome manual investigation and take an undesirably long time. Thus,
it is desirable to ensure sustainable grid operation performance in the presence of such hard-to-confirm attacks.
SDN provides a mechanism for building a virtual network layer on top of physical communication links
[14]. This additional layer can help mitigate the impact of the hard-to-confirm attacks. A virtual network
is often defined to connect devices and convey packets that belong to a certain grid control application. By
leveraging the control plane functionality, an SDN virtual network can enable finer-grained network status
monitoring. For instance, an SDN virtual network can implement adaptive calculation of QoS metrics, e.g.,
link-wise delivery latency and packet loss rate, according to the dynamic evolution of the underlying physical
network. Based on the monitoring result, the SDN controller can rapidly reset or even re-establish a virtual
network for a grid control application to isolate suspicious switches. This is analogous to the “golden rule
of thumb” of restarting a computer to quickly get rid of suspicious or transient issues. Without SDN, such
network reset and re-establishment can be neither fast nor non-disruptive.
Fine-grained network status awareness and global control enable the SDN controller to strategically reset
or re-establish a virtual network. The controller can schedule which switches to reset in phases to minimize
disruption to the network traffic. It can also redirect the affected flows to alternative routes, while avoiding
suspicious switches. Moreover, the global view of the network status will enable the SDN controller to re-
establish a virtual network without adversely impacting the QoS of other virtual networks that have shared
portion of physical communication links.
4.3 Hot-Swapping between Private & Public Communication Networks
One key aspect of grid resilience is the grid’s need to survive major failures caused by catastrophic hazards and
large-scale attacks (A1 and A2). Examples include distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks that compromise various
switches, relays, and RTUs, which can lead to severe congestion of certain portion of the grid communication
network. So far, the power grid has been primarily employing dedicated cables or leased communication links
and networks [12, p.425][29]. While providing better isolation in general, such dedicated or leased links may be
less resilient to intensive attacks, as they have limited bandwidth and routes. Some grid operators have started
to embrace alternative means of communication (e.g., the Internet and wireless networks), for better (although
shared) bandwidth and adoption of recent cybersecurity advances, e.g., modern cryptography [34]. However,
many are still quite cautious of transmitting sensitive readings and grid control commands via the Internet, as
it is supposedly more susceptible to cyber threats.
SDN can provide a unique approach to leveraging both leased lines and the public Internet to provide a
highly robust survivability solution for grid operation communications, while minimizing the potential risk of
exposure to cyber attacks. For instance, grid operators may rely on the leased lines for routine communications.
However, under devastating circumstances, e.g., a significant portion of the grid communication links has been
paralyzed, we can leverage SDN technologies to dynamically establish a faster route via the Internet as an
emergency response. During the process, the SDN controller can dispatch flows to the remaining functional
leased lines and the Internet according to their security requirements. For enhanced security, the SDN controller
can also instruct respective control devices to enable encryption for packets being forwarded to routes via
Internet. Such an approach enables fast response to extreme situations where ordinary priorities (e.g., “safer”
leased lines versus fast recovery of grid operations) have changed.
5 Challenges in Using SDN for Grid Resilience
While enabling flexible reconfigurability, the separation of the control and data planes in SDN may bring in
additional challenges in defending against attacks that target the powerful and centralized control plane. In
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Figure 3: A cyber-physical co-simulation testbed.
particular, attackers may specifically target the control plane of SDN-enabled grid communication networks for
sabotage and hiding. Further research on such potential issues is of great importance and urgency, to eliminate
or alleviate the technical hurdles for field trials and deployments of SDN in smart grids.
Topology destruction by malicious control: Because of the centralization of network control, an SDN is
susceptible to a compromised SDN controller and/or the SDN applications on top of it (A3). Compromised
SDN controller and applications may maliciously change the configurations of the communication network, with
the goal of undermining the performance of grid control applications or even destroying the whole network. As
high availability is a critical requirement for smart grids, such a potential vulnerability needs to be carefully
managed. Existing studies have applied model checking to examine SDN control messages in the general
networking context [2, 6]. However, unique challenges arise in the specific context of smart grids, because of
the need to consider the implications of SDN control messages for the physical and grid control systems. For
instance, malicious rerouting of a sensor/control data flow using a long-latency path may still be valid from a
pure networking perspective. However, it may significantly undermine the quality of grid controls [4, 32, 33]. To
address this challenge, we propose to use IDS to examine the cyber and physical implications of each outgoing
SDN control message, e.g., by real-time simulation [18] and machine-learning-based analysis [21].
DoS attacks accelerated by centralized control: The disproportionate network bandwidth and processing
capability between the control and data planes may significantly elevate the magnitude as well as speed of DoS
attacks. Existing studies (e.g., [8]) have shown that such DoS attacks may be launched by compromised SDN
switches (A1) and malicious end hosts (A2), which flood the SDN controller with spoofed packets requesting a
new flow rule. In spite of existing studies [8] that monitor SDN messages and detect successful DoS attacks by
monitoring data plane traffic, detecting and counteracting DoS attempts at the control plane is still a challenging
problem. Fortunately, several characteristics of smart grids will be helpful to development of robust techniques
for detecting DoS attempts, e.g., rather regular SCADA traffic, static publisher-subscriber multicast data flows
for PMU [9], and IEC 61850 Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) [20].
Darknet created by SDN “rootkits”: By strategically manipulating the forwarding rules in different
switches, an attacker who compromises part of the control plane of an SDN system can surreptitiously create
a “darknet” within it (A1). Such a darknet can be used to control the communications to key field devices
in the smart grid, such as RTUs and relays, while being invisible to the rest of the network. We find such
a darknet analogous to rootkits in computer operating systems that are hidden in the kernel and completely
evade user-space monitoring mechanisms; we call them SDN rootkits. Such SDN rootkits would paralyze the
monitoring and control functions of the smart grid, like what happened in the Stuxnet attack but with a much
easier attack procedure. Passive monitoring approaches will not be sufficient to detect SDN rootkits. We
envisage development of countermeasures through strategic deployment of out-of-band detectors in the grid
communication network and through leveraging of the latest progress on rootkit detection [36, 23].
6 An SDN-Enabled Smart Grid Testbed
We propose a testbed to provide an empirical platform for fast prototyping and quick validation of the advan-
tages and challenges of the SDN-grid integration discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Such a testbed must involve
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realistic cyber (SDN) and physical (grid dynamics and operations) aspects for simulating the cyber-physical
nature of the SDN-enabled smart grid. Although recent studies have developed various co-simulation testbeds
based on power system simulators and network simulators (e.g., ns-2) [22, 30], none of them have explored the
implications and effects of a dynamically controllable communication network on a grid.
Therefore, in the proposed testbed, we leverage Mininet, a popular OpenFlow-based SDN emulator, to
emulate SDN-based smart grid communications; we leverage PowerWorld, a high-fidelity power generation and
transmission system simulator, to simulate the physical aspects of power systems. Our testbed will enable a
co-simulation platform that integrates and coordinates both networking and power system simulations from
Mininet and PowerWorld, allowing for experiments on the opportunities and challenges of enabling greater grid
resilience with SDN techniques. For instance, it will be able to provide a worst-case estimate of how long it
will take to reset or re-establish a virtual network (Section 4.2), and how affordable such a delay would be for
power systems. As another example, with such a testbed, we can quickly test with different configurations of
private/public network hot-swapping, and evaluate the extent to which they can improve the promptness of
control commands, and thus the power system quality (Section 4.3).
Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of the proposed
co-simulation testbed, which consists of a Power Grid Simulation Server (PGSS), a Control Center Simulation
Server (CCSS), and a Mininet. The PGSS leverages PowerWorld to simulate the physical processes of gener-
ators, a transmission system, and loads, which provide the “ground truth” of the physical aspect of a power
grid. We have used a Python wrapper of the PowerWorld COM API to implement real-time manipulation
and access to the internal state (e.g., status of generators, load, meters, circuit breakers) of a PowerWorld
simulation session. The CCSS can implement several grid monitoring and control applications, SDN control
applications based on NOX, and IDS applications based on Bro [1], as described in [18]. Examples of grid
monitoring and control applications include state estimation, under-frequency load shedding, and automatic
generation control (AGC). The Bro-based IDS detects malicious outgoing grid and SDN control commands
by predicting their execution consequences through rapid steady-state analysis using MATPOWER in GNU
Octave, or through transient simulations using PowerWorld. The communications between the CCSS and any
simulated field device in the PGSS go through Mininet, within which a node is associated with a field device
in the PGSS. To increase the realism of co-simulations, all simulated field devices and the CCSS communicate
in DNP3, a protocol widely adopted by power grids.
In summary, the testbed will support simulations of complete closed-loop grid controls driven by the cyber
and physical “ground truth” from Mininet and PowerWorld. It will provide an environment to validate and
evaluate innovative ideas and solutions of using SDN to improve grid resilience.
7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the opportunities that SDN may bring to smart grids for improving resilience, and the
corresponding challenges that still remain. With three illustrative use cases, the paper demonstrates the
potential of SDN in strengthening the resilience of smart grids, even under catastrophic circumstances. On the
other hand, there are several critical challenges that need to be further studied and addressed before SDN can
be securely deployed in smart grids. We hope that our discussion and our initial design of an experimental
testbed can trigger more profound research to make SDN more viable for resilient smart grids.
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